The Absent-minded Centipede (revision)

In this note we apply the notion of absent-mindedness (see Piccione and Rubinstein, 1994), which is a form of imperfect recall, to Rosenthal's (1981) centipede game. We show that for standard versions of the centipede game a subgame perfect equilibrium exists in which play is continued almost to the end if one player is known to be absent-minded. In fact, it is sufficient that one player is known to be absent-minded with sufficiently high probability.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1996-10-08
Authors:	Dulleck, Uwe ; Oechssler, Joerg
Institutions:	EconWPA

More details

Extent:	application/pdf application/postscript
Series:	Game Theory and Information.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	8 pages, this revision actually contains Figure 1. 8 pages
Classification:	C72 - Noncooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005062381