The additionality problem with offsets: Optimal contracts for carbon sequestration in forests
Year of publication: |
2013
|
---|---|
Authors: | Mason, Charles F. ; Plantinga, Andrew |
Published in: |
Journal of environmental economics and management : JEEM ; the official journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists. - Amsterdam : Elsevier, ISSN 0095-0696, ZDB-ID 188687-3. - Vol. 66.2013, 1, p. 1-14
|
Subject: | Carbon sequestration | Incentive contracting | Offsets | Additionality | CO2-Speicherung | Carbon capture | Treibhausgas-Emissionen | Greenhouse gas emissions | Klimaschutz | Climate protection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Klimawandel | Climate change |
-
Contracting for Impure Public Goods : Carbon Offsets and Additionality
Mason, Charles F., (2014)
-
Contracting for Impure Public Goods : Carbon Offsets and Additionality
Mason, Charles F., (2014)
-
Contracting for Impure Public Goods : Carbon Offsets and Additionality
Mason, Charles, (2011)
- More ...
-
Contracting for Impure Public Goods : Carbon Offsets and Additionality
Mason, Charles F., (2014)
-
Contracting for Impure Public Goods : Carbon Offsets and Additionality
Mason, Charles F., (2014)
-
Contracting for impure public goods : carbon offsets and additionality
Mason, Charles F., (2011)
- More ...