The agency problem revisited : a structural analysis of managerial productivity and CEO compensation in large US commercial banks
Year of publication: |
2021
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Authors: | Liu, Shasha ; Sickles, Robin C. |
Published in: |
Empirical economics : a quarterly journal of the Institute for Advanced Studies. - Berlin : Springer, ISSN 1435-8921, ZDB-ID 1462176-9. - Vol. 60.2021, 1, p. 391-418
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Subject: | Banking | Panel data | Stochastic frontier | Sources of efficiency | Managerial compensation | Bank | Führungskräfte | Managers | USA | United States | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Technische Effizienz | Technical efficiency | Produktivität | Productivity | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Effizienz | Efficiency | Schätzung | Estimation |
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