The Ambiguous Case for Letting Regulators Tailor Standards

Restrictions preventing regulators from setting standards on a firm by firm basis are commonly assumed to be inefficient. Existing rationales for their prevalence have been politico-economic. We provide an efficiency interpretation. We characterise settings in which the requirement that firms be treated equally is (a) definitely desirable (b) definitely undesirable and (c) where the case is ambiguous.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2000-02
Authors:	Heyes, Anthony
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London
Subject:	Environmental regulation \| ratchet effect \| instrument choice

More details

Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	Number 99/10
Classification:	L51 - Economics of Regulation ; Q28 - Government Policy
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005489939