The architecture of federations : constitutions, bargaining, and moral hazard
Christoph Luelfesmann; Anke Kessler; Gordon M. Myers
| Year of publication: |
2015
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Lülfesmann, Christoph ; Kessler, Anke S. ; Myers, Gordon M. |
| Published in: |
Journal of public economics. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0047-2727, ZDB-ID 183995-0. - Vol. 124.2015, p. 18-29
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| Subject: | Federalism | Constitutions | Decentralization | Grants | Political bargaining | Föderalismus | Verfassung | Constitution | Finanzbeziehungen | Fiscal relations | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Verhandlungstheorie | Bargaining theory | Dezentralisierung | Finanzausgleich | Intergovernmental transfers | Regionalpolitik | Regional policy | Verhandlungen | Negotiations |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011337664