The Case of two Self-Enforcing International Agreements for Environmental Protection with Asymmetric Countries
Year of publication: |
2010
|
---|---|
Authors: | Osmani, Dritan ; Tol, Richard |
Published in: |
Computational Economics. - Society for Computational Economics - SCE, ISSN 0927-7099. - Vol. 36.2010, 2, p. 93-119
|
Publisher: |
Society for Computational Economics - SCE |
Subject: | Self-enforcing international environmental agreements | Non-cooperative game theory | Stability | Nonlinear optimization |
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