The central core and the mid-central core as novel set-valued and point-valued solution concepts for transferable utility coalitional games
Year of publication: |
2021
|
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Authors: | Rogna, Marco |
Published in: |
Mathematical social sciences. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : NH, Elsevier, ISSN 0165-4896, ZDB-ID 283230-6. - Vol. 109.2021, p. 1-11
|
Subject: | Axiomatization | Cooperative game theory | Optimization | Solution concepts | Core | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Kooperatives Spiel | Cooperative game | Transferierbarer Nutzen | Transferable utility | Koalition | Coalition |
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