The coalition of industrialists and environmentalists in the climate change issue

The political economy idea developed by Ackerman and Hassler (1981) is the starting point of this <p> paper. It suggested that a coalition of environmentalists and industrialists successfully lobbied the <p> US Congress. More strict technology-based standards for new sources than existing sources was the <p> resulting policy outcome serving the common interest of the coalition because it both offered a <p> barrier to entry for new firms and improved environmental quality. We focus both on cases from air <p> and water pollution in the US confirming which seem to confirm this suggestion and the case of <p> international climate negotiations and the promotion of wind-based energy. In the line of the <p> Ackerman and Hassler approach we suggest that the reason for EU eagerness to push forward <p> ambitious reduction target levels (and thereby promote new green industries) is a similar coalition <p> between industrialists and environmentalists. Such a strategy can be seen in the context of the <p> Bootleggers and Baptist theory developed by Yandle (1983), where the Baptists (in our case the <p> environmentalists) demand changes in behaviour on moral reasons. In contrast, the Bootleggers (the <p> producers of renewable energy), who profit from the very regulation, keep a low profile. The actual <p> heavy subsidisation of renewable energy sources, such as wind energy, can be viewed as a <p> successful policy outcome for the coalition of industrialists and environmentalists offering both <p> market protection and improved environmental quality. Solving the current dead-lock in <p> international climate negotiations across the Atlantic may well imply fighting the strong coalition of <p> industrialists and environmentalists. Such a political battle may turn out to be just as tough as <p> fighting windmills if not clearly investigated in future research.