The consequences for a monopolistic insurance firm of evaluating risk better than customers : the adverse selection hypothesis reversed
Year of publication: |
2000
|
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Authors: | Villeneuve, Bertrand |
Published in: |
The Geneva papers on risk and insurance theory. - Boston, Mass. [u.a.] : Kluwer Acad. Publ., ISSN 0926-4957, ZDB-ID 1130377-3. - Vol. 25.2000, 1, p. 65-79
|
Subject: | Versicherungsökonomik | Economics of insurance | Risikomodell | Risk model | Adverse Selektion | Adverse selection | Monopol | Monopoly | Informationswert | Information value | Theorie | Theory |
Extent: | Graph. Darst |
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Type of publication: | Article |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: The Geneva papers on risk and insurance theory |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
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