The contractor game: a theoretical and experimental analysis

We introduce the contractor game , related to the ultimatum game (UG). The proposer makes an offer , and simultaneously sends a cheap talk message , indicating (possibly falsely) the amount of the offer. The responder observes the message with certainty and the offer with probability p before accepting or rejecting the offer. We theoretically examine versions with p = 0 and p = 0.5 along with the UG, played by some standard economic agents and others who are averse to inequity, lies and lying. The equilibria yield intuitive predictions, which are supported by our experimental results. Offers are higher when they might be seen by the responder. Messages over–state offers, but less so when the offer might be seen. Responders are more likely to accept an unseen offer if it might have been seen. When offers are seen, responders reward truthful messages, rather than punishing lies, compared to when no message is sent.