The Cooperative Solution of Stochastic Games
Building on the work of Nash, Harsanyi, and Shapley, we define a cooperative solution for strategic games that takes account of both the competitive and the cooperative aspects of such games. We prove existence in the general (NTU) case and uniqueness in the TU case. Our main result is an extension of the definition and the existence and uniqueness theorems to stochastic games - discounted or undiscounted.
Year of publication: |
2015-02
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Authors: | Kohlberg, Elon ; Neyman, Abraham |
Institutions: | Center for the Study of Rationality, Hebrew University of Jerusalem |
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