The dark side of team incentives: Experimental evidence on advice quality from financial service professionals

In an experiment with professionals from the financial services sector, we investigate the impact of a team incentive scheme on the recommendation quality of investment products when advisors benefit from advising lower quality products. Experimental results reveal that, when group affiliation is strong, inferior products are recommended significantly more often under team incentives than under individual incentives.

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Year of publication:	2013
Authors:	Danilov, Anastasia ; Biemann, Torsten ; Kring, Thorn ; Sliwka, Dirk
Published in:	Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. - Elsevier, ISSN 0167-2681. - Vol. 93.2013, C, p. 266-272
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Deception \| Team incentives \| Experiment \| Financial advice \| Misadvising \| Sender-receiver game

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	C91 - Laboratory, Individual Behavior ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; G20 - Financial Institutions and Services. General ; J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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