The Design, Testing, and Implementation of Virginia's Nox Allowance Auction

We report on the design and testing of three auction mechanisms to maximize revenue and efficiency in the sale of two vintages of nitrous oxide emission allowances by the Commonwealth of Virginia in 2004. The three mechanisms considered were a combinatorial sealed bid (CSB) auction, a sequential English clock (SEC) auction, and a combinatorial English clock (CEC) auction. We find the SEC and CEC mechanisms to be superior the CSB when demand is relatively elastic

MoreLess

Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Porter, David P.
Other Persons:	Rassenti, Stephen J. (contributor) ; Shobe, William (contributor) ; Smith, Vernon L. (contributor) ; Winn, Abel (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Auktionstheorie \| Auction theory \| Emissionshandel \| Emissions trading \| Experimentelle Ökonomik \| Experimental economics \| Auktion \| Auction
Description of contents:	Abstract [papers.ssrn.com]

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Vol. 69, No. 2, 2009 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments October 25, 2006 erstellt Volltext nicht verfügbar
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013051860