The Determinants of CEO Inside Debt and its Components

I use the new SEC disclosure rule of 2006 to examine the role of CEO inside debt (pension plans and deferred compensation plans) in CEO compensation problem. I find that the contribution ratio of deferred compensation to total cash compensation is positively related to firm size, firm liquidity status, firm default risk, and executive personal wealth. In addition, I find a non-linear relation between firm leverage and CEO inside debt. The investigation shows that the underlying reasons for this non-linear relation may relate to firm financial distress and CEO risk aversion. This finding suggests that inside debt plays a more complex role in mitigating the asset substitution problem

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Year of publication:	2011
Authors:	Cen, Wei
Publisher:	[2011]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation

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Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (60 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 10, 2010 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.1716306 [DOI]
Classification:	D23 - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights ; G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; G38 - Government Policy and Regulation ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; J44 - Professional Labor Markets and Occupations ; M14 - Corporate Culture; Social Responsibility ; M52 - Compensation and Compensation Methods and Their Effects (stock options, fringe benefits, incentives, family support programs)
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013132444