The Dual of Bertrand with Homogenous Products is Cournot with Perfect Complements

The quantity-setting (Cournot) oligopoly with perfect complements is dual to the price-setting (Bertrand) oligopoly with homogeneous goods. Under mild technical conditions, the former setting has a unique (pure strategy) Nash equilibrium with null quantities

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Year of publication:	[2022]
Authors:	Bertoletti, Paolo
Publisher:	[S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Duopol \| Duopoly \| Spieltheorie \| Game theory \| Preiswettbewerb \| Price competition

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (8 p)
Series:	University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper ; No. 490
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: University of Milan Bicocca Department of Economics, Management and Statistics Working Paper No. 490 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments February 14, 2022 erstellt
Classification:	D11 - Consumer Economics: Theory ; D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; D6 - Welfare Economics
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013305575