The Effect of CEO Option Compensation on the Capital Structure : A Natural Experiment

CEO option compensation and the capital structure decision are simultaneously made choices. Using the Internal Revenue Code 162(m) tax law as an exogenous shock to compensation structure in a natural experiment setting, I can identify firm leverage changes as a result of CEO option compensation changes. The evidence provides strong support for debt agency theory. The results indicate firms decrease leverage when CEOs are paid with more options, and when CEO options become a higher percentage of future cash flows. The findings remain robust after controlling for corporate governance and convertible debt

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Year of publication:	2019
Authors:	Tosun, Onur Kemal
Publisher:	[2019]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Führungskräfte \| Managers \| Kapitalstruktur \| Capital structure \| Experiment \| Aktienoption \| Stock option \| Managervergütung \| Executive compensation

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (41 p)
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	In: Financial Management, Vol.45, Issue 4, pages 953-979, 2016 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments 2016 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2022354 [DOI]
Classification:	G32 - Financing Policy; Capital and Ownership Structure ; J33 - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods ; C23 - Models with Panel Data ; C33 - Models with Panel Data
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012904713