The Effect of Dynamic and Static Choice Sets on Political Decision Making : An Analysis Using the Decision Board Platform

Previous studies of political decision making have used only ''static'' choice sets, where alternatives are ''fixed'' and are a priori known to the decision maker. We assess the affect of a dynamic choice set (new alternatives appear during the decision process) on strategy selection and choice in international politics. We suggest that decision makers use a mixture of decision strategies when making decisions in a true-stage process consisting of an initial screening of available alternatives, and a selection of the best one from the subset of remaining alternatives. To test the effects of dynamic and static choice sets on the decision process we introduce a computer-based ''process tracer'' in a study of top-ranking officers in the U.S. Air Force. The results show that (1) national security decision makers use a mixture of strategies in arriving at a decision, and (2) strategy selection and choice are significantly influenced by the structure of the choice set (static versus dynamic)