The effect of monitoring on CEO compensation in a matching equilibrium
Pierre Chaigneau and Nicolas Sahuguet
| Year of publication: |
June 2018
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Chaigneau, Pierre ; Sahuguet, Nicolas |
| Published in: |
Journal of financial and quantitative analysis : JFQA. - New York, NY [u.a.] : Cambridge University Press, ISSN 0022-1090, ZDB-ID 219406-5. - Vol. 53.2018, 3, p. 1297-1339
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| Subject: | CEO compensation | CEO retention | corporate governance | monitoring | ownership structure | Führungskräfte | Managers | Eigentümerstruktur | Ownership structure | Corporate Governance | Corporate governance | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Vergütungssystem | Compensation system | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Leistungsbeurteilung | Employee performance appraisal | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Vorstand | Executive board |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1017/S0022109017001065 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011930415