The effect of the status quo tie-breaking rule on prize winning

This paper considers a contest in which two identical players participate to compete for an indivisible prize. It is shown that, in the presence of incomplete information, the player favored by the status quo tie-breaking rule may be less likely to get the prize than his competitor, even though, under the coin toss tie-breaking rule, the two players participate with the same positive probability and hence are equally likely to get the prize.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Xu, Xiaopeng
Published in:	Economics Bulletin. - AccessEcon, ISSN 1545-2921. - Vol. 4.2002, 2, p. 1-5
Publisher:	AccessEcon

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Extent:	application/pdf
Type of publication:	Article
Language:	English
Classification:	D8 - Information and Uncertainty ; C7 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468817