The Effective Use of Limited Information : Do Bid Maximums Reduce Procurement Costs in Asymmetric Auctions
Year of publication: |
2016
|
---|---|
Authors: | Hellerstein, Daniel |
Other Persons: | Higgins, Nathaniel Alan (contributor) |
Publisher: |
[2016]: [S.l.] : SSRN |
Subject: | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Beschaffung | Procurement | Öffentlicher Auftrag | Public contract | Auktion | Auction | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information |
Extent: | 1 Online-Ressource (17 p) |
---|---|
Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Notes: | In: Agricultural and Resource Economics Review, 39/2 (April 2010) 288-304 Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments April 19, 2010 erstellt |
Classification: | Q28 - Government Policy ; Q24 - Land ; D44 - Auctions |
Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
-
Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement : conference paper
Rosar, Frank, (2014)
-
Ex-post optimal knapsack procurement
Jarman, Felix, (2015)
-
Bayesian implementation and rent extraction in a multi-dimensional procurement problem
Herweg, Fabian, (2018)
- More ...
-
Improving the Cost-Effectiveness of the Conservation Reserve Program : A Laboratory Study
Cramton, Peter C., (2019)
-
Fooks, Jacob R., (2016)
-
Options for Improving Conservation Programs : Insights from Auction Theory and Economic Experiments
Hellerstein, Daniel, (2016)
- More ...