THE EFFECTS OF FIRM CHARACTERISTICS AND RECOGNITION POLICY ON EMPLOYEE STOCK OPTIONS PRICES AFTER CONTROLLING FOR SELF-SELECTION

We examine whether and how firm characteristics, including firm size and liquidity, affect the relation between employee stock option (ESO) grants (as proxied by disclosed ESO expenses) and firm value. We also investigate how the implementation of a new share-based compensation recognition rule affects the pricing effect of ESOs. Prior studies have provided mixed results concerning how ESOs affect firm value. We argue that their findings could be attributable to self-selection and a non-uniform ESO-share price relation. We use the threshold model to address our research questions after controlling for self-selection bias. We find that markets tend to positively price ESOs in the case of firms characterized by large size and low liquidity. In addition, we find that after the new rule came into effect, ESOs became positively associated with firm value. These results are congruent with ownership and symbolic value theories, the lifecycle stages hypothesis and the contention that an ESO expensing policy enhances the quality of financial statements.