The effects of imperfect auditing on managerial compensation
Angelo Baglioni; Luca Colombo
| Year of publication: |
2011
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Baglioni, Angelo ; Colombo, Luca |
| Published in: |
International review of economics & finance : IREF. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 1059-0560, ZDB-ID 1137476-7. - Vol. 20.2011, 4, p. 542-548
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| Subject: | Imperfect auditing | Misreporting | Stock options | Managerial incentives | Aktienoption | Stock option | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Wirtschaftsprüfung | Financial audit | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Anreiz | Incentives |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009303982