The Effects of Incentive Subjectivity and Strategy Communication on Knowledge-Sharing and Extra-Role Behaviours

This study examines the effects of performance measurement system design on employees' willingness to share knowledge and their general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours. Two key design issues are examined, namely, incentive scheme subjectivity and communicating the value of human-based intangible assets through a strategy map. Using a controlled experiment we found that employees are more willing to share knowledge with a co-worker (even if it means diverting resources away from incentivised areas) under a subjective weighting scheme than a formula-based scheme. In addition, we found an interaction effect where the communication of the strategic value of human-based intangible assets increases employees' general tendency to pursue extra-role behaviours under a subjective weighting scheme, but decreases this tendency under a formula-based scheme. Our study contributes to the performance management literature and has implications for practice by providing empirical evidence demonstrating how the design of performance measurement systems can motivate discretionary behaviours in relation to performance areas that are not recognised by the formal incentive scheme