THE EFFECTS OF LENIENCY PROGRAMS AND FINES ON CARTEL STABILITY

Using a stylized oligopoly model, we analyze the effect of cartel deterring fines, taking into consideration exemptions granted to cartel members cooperating with the competition authorities. We conclude that the fines can act as a deterrent to breaking collusive agreements, thus stabilizing the cartel. Copyright © 2007 The Authors; Journal compilation © 2007 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

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Year of publication:	2007
Authors:	Chavda, Ankur ; Jegers, Marc
Published in:	Metroeconomica. - Wiley Blackwell, ISSN 0026-1386. - Vol. 58.2007, 2, p. 231-243
Publisher:	Wiley Blackwell

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Extent:	text/html
Type of publication:	Article
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005203269