The effects of risk preference and loss aversion on individual behavior under bonus, penalty, and combined contract frames
Year of publication: |
2013
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Authors: | Brink, Alisa G. ; Rankin, Frederick W. |
Published in: |
Behavioral research in accounting. - Sarasota, Fla. : American Accounting Association, ISSN 1050-4753, ZDB-ID 1115948-0. - Vol. 25.2013, 2, p. 145-170
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Subject: | framing | incentives | loss aversion | Prospect Theory | Prospect theory | Risikoaversion | Risk aversion | Experiment | Risikopräferenz | Risk attitude | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Erwartungsnutzen | Expected utility | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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