The effort-maximizing contest with heterogeneous prizes

We establish the effort-maximizing rule of allocating heterogeneous prizes when contestants privately observe their effort efficiencies. With ex ante symmetric players and increasing virtual effort efficiency, an all pay auction maximizes the total expected effort.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Liu, Xuyuan ; Lu, Jingfeng
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 125.2014, 3, p. 422-425
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	All pay auction \| Grand contest \| Split contest \| Subcontest \| Virtual effort of efficiency

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	D44 - Auctions ; D72 - Economic Models of Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Elections, Legistures, and Voting Behavior ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011116209