The emergence of norms from conflicts over just distributions

Why is it that well-intentioned actions can create persistent conflicts? While norms are widely regarded as a source for cooperation,this article proposes a novel theory in which the emergence of normscan be understood as a bargaining process in which normative conflicts explain the nally emerging norm. The theory is tested with adynamical experiment on conflicts over the consideration of equality,eort or efficiency for the distribution of joint earnings. Normativeconflict is measured by the number of rejected oers in a recursivebargaining game. The emerging normative system is analyzed by feed-back cycles between micro- and macro-level. It is demonstrated thatmore normative cues cause more normative conflict. Further, underthe structural conditions of either simple or complex situations, theconvergence towards a simple and widely shared norm is likely. In con-trast, in moderately complex situations, convergence is unlikely andseveral equally reasonable norms co-exist. The ndings are discussedwith respect to the integration of sociological conflict theory with thebargaining concept in economic theory.