The Evolution of Communication in a Sender/Receiver Game of Common Interest with Cheap Talk

We study a sender/receiver game in which a large number of players engage in repeated anonymous interactions, over a long time horizon. We expand the standard sender/receiver game by adding a neutral action to the receiver's action space.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Arifovic, J ; Eaton, C
Institutions:	Department of Economics, Simon Fraser University
Subject:	BARGAINING \| INFORMATION

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Series:	Discussion Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	21 pages
Classification:	C63 - Computational Techniques ; C70 - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory. General ; C72 - Noncooperative Games ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; D83 - Search, Learning, Information and Knowledge
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005597110