The ex ante incentive compatible core in the absence of wealth effects.

In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints : the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.

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Year of publication:	2002
Authors:	Forges, Françoise ; Mertens, Jean-François ; Vohra, Rajiv
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine
Subject:	Exchange economy \| Core \| quasi–linear \| absence of wealth effects \| transferable utility \| ex ante \| incentive compatibility \| asymmetric information

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Econometrica (2002) v.70, p.-
Classification:	D51 - Exchange and Production Economies ; D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10008790083