The ex ante incentive compatible core of the assignement game.

We consider two-sided matching markets in which agents have private information on a state of nature which determines the agents' utilities of matching. Monetary transfers are allowed and utility functions are quasi-linear. The model thus extends the assignment game introduced by Shapley and Shubik. We prove that the ex ante incentive compatible core and the (interim) incentive compatible coarse core of the matching game are both non-empty.

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Year of publication:	2004-03
Authors:	Forges, Françoise
Institutions:	Université Paris-Dauphine
Subject:	Théorie des jeux \| Information privée \| jeux coopératifs

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	Open Access publications from Université Paris-Dauphine.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (2004-03) v.47, p.135-151
Classification:	D82 - Asymmetric and Private Information ; C78 - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory ; C71 - Cooperative Games
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008532579