The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given
Year of publication: |
2000
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Authors: | Engelmann, Dirk ; Strobel, Martin |
Published in: |
Experimental economics : a journal of the Economic Science Association. - Dordrecht [u.a.] : Springer Science + Business Media B.V., ISSN 1386-4157, ZDB-ID 1386451-8. - Vol. 3.2000, 3, p. 241-260
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Subject: | Erwartungsbildung | Expectation formation | Gruppenentscheidung | Group decision-making | Experiment | Information | Anreiz | Incentives | Deutschland | Germany | Entscheidung unter Unsicherheit | Decision under uncertainty |
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