The Financial Lobby and Impact of Other Stakeholders in the EU: A good model for emancipation of the financial system in Kosovo

Lobbying is a phenomenon which is already present in all political systems and it is not surprising if you consider the issue of lobbying within the formal structures of governance of financial markets and financial industry in the EU and Kosovo. However, the complex and inscrutable institutional structures in EU inevitably result in an inevitable quality of lobbying, which give more influence to the stakeholders that have the resources to organize and develop systematic lobbying activities. This paper describes how lobbying of influential institutions groups in EU, involved in decision making about financial services and markets, occurs through official channels, such as public consultations, and through informal means, such as close meetings between lobbyists and decision makers or officials within EU institutions. In this context we intend to rationalize such a behavior pattern in the regulation of the financial system in Kosovo. Kosovo has some fundamental problems in the field of regulation of the financial system and financial industry in conformity with the rules of functioning of the market economies. Instead of formal and official conversation between interest groups about the regulation of financial system, frequently are used corrupt models of influence which later are classified as criminal, and often classified as organized crime activities. From this point of view lobbying should be considered as a reasonable option within the formal structures of governance of financial markets and financial industry in Kosovo.