The first-order approach to principal-agent problems
Year of publication: |
1985
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Authors: | Rogerson, William P. |
Published in: |
Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an international society for the advancement of economic theory in its relation to statistics and mathematics. - [Wechselnde Erscheinungsorte] : [Wechselnde Verlage], ISSN 0012-9682, ZDB-ID 1798-X. - Vol. 53.1985, 6, p. 1357-1367
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Subject: | Wirtschaftlicher Anreiz | Nutzen | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Theorie | Theory | Moral Hazard | Moral hazard | Leistungsanreiz | Performance incentive |
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