The folk theorem for repeated games with time-dependent discounting
Year of publication: |
2022
|
---|---|
Authors: | Kim, Daehyun ; Li, Xiaoxi |
Published in: |
Mathematics of operations research. - Hanover, Md. : INFORMS, ISSN 1526-5471, ZDB-ID 2004273-5. - Vol. 47.2022, 2, p. 1631-1647
|
Subject: | folk theorem | perfect public equilibrium | public monitoring | repeated games | subgame perfect Nash equilibrium | time-dependent discounting | time-inconsistency | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Folk-Theorem | Folk theorem | Nash-Gleichgewicht | Nash equilibrium | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Diskontierung | Discounting | Gleichgewichtstheorie | Equilibrium theory | Gleichgewichtsmodell | Equilibrium model |
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