THE FOLK THEOREM WITH INPERFECT PUBLIC INFORMATION.
Year of publication: |
1989
|
---|---|
Authors: | FUDENBERG, D. ; LEVINE, D.K. ; MASKIN, E. |
Institutions: | Economics Department, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) |
Subject: | information | game theory | economic models |
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