The Gains from Forming a Joint Venture in a New Market with Rivals in an Existing Market: the Bertrand Case

We show that under Bertrand competition, firms may have an incentive to transfer real ressources to a joint venture operating in an unrelated market. The optimal transfers are typically asymmetric, in order to reduce the extent of rivalry in the oligopoly.

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Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Van Long, N. ; Soubeyran, A.
Institutions:	Groupement de Recherche en Économie Quantitative d'Aix-Marseille (GREQAM), Aix-Marseille School of Economics (AMSE)
Subject:	MARKET STRUCTURE \| OLIGOPOLIES

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Series:	G.R.E.Q.A.M..
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	15 pages
Classification:	D4 - Market Structure and Pricing ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005634430