The Half-Win Set and the Geometry of Spatial Voting Games: Research Note.
In the spatial context, when preferences can be characterized by circular indifference curves, we show that we can derive all the information about the majority preference relationship in a space from the win-set of any single point. Furthermore, the size of win sets increases for points along any ray outward from a central point in the space, the point that is the center of the yolk. To prove these results we emply a useful new geometric constructio, the half-win set. The implication of these results is that embedding choice in a continuous n-dimensional space imposes great constraints on the nature of the majority-preference relationship. Copyright 1991 by Kluwer Academic Publishers
Year of publication: |
1991
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Authors: | Feld, Scott L ; Grofman, Bernard |
Published in: |
Public Choice. - Springer. - Vol. 70.1991, 2, p. 245-50
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Publisher: |
Springer |
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