The Hotelling Model With Capacity Precommitment.

We consider the two-stage game proposed by Kreps and Scheinkman in the adress model of horizontal differenciation developed by Hotelling. Firms choose capacities in the first stage and then compete in price. We show that capacity precommitment softens price competitio drastically.

MoreLess

Year of publication:	1997
Authors:	Boccard, N. ; Wauthy, X.
Institutions:	Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE), École des Sciences Économiques de Louvain
Subject:	OLIGOPOLIES \| TRADE

More details

Series:	Papers.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	32 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; F13 - Commercial Policy; Protection; Promotion; Trade Negotiations ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005669256