The IMF and global financial crises : Phoenix Rising?

Cover -- THE IMF AND GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISES -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedicatiopn -- Contents -- List of Figures, Tables, and Boxes -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Abbreviations -- 1 Introduction -- 1.1 IPGs and Financial Stability -- 1.2 IGOs and the IMF -- 1.3 Principals and Agents -- 1.4 Overview -- 2 Bretton Woods -- 2.1 New Order -- 2.2 Administrative Arrangements -- 2.3 Adjustment versus Finance -- 2.4 Collapse of Bretton Woods -- 2.5 IMF and Bretton Woods: Appraisal -- 3 Transitions -- 3.1 New Responsibilities -- 3.2 Euromarkets -- 3.3 Recycling -- 3.4 New Organizations -- 3.5 IMF and the Nonsystem: Appraisal -- 4 The Debt Crisis -- 4.1 Crisis Emergence -- 4.2 Crisis Manager -- 4.3 Program Breakdowns -- 4.4 Crisis Resolution -- 4.5 Basel I -- 4.6 IMF and the Debt Crisis: Appraisal -- 5 Global Finance Redux -- 5.1 Resurgence of Capital Flows -- 5.2 IMF Programs and Capital Decontrol -- 5.3 Catalysis -- 5.4 New Amendment -- 5.5 IMF and Financial Liberalization: Appraisal -- 6 Currency Crises -- 6.1 ERM -- 6.2 IMF and the ERM Crisis: Appraisal -- 6.3 Mexico: Crisis -- 6.4 Mexico: Aftermath -- 6.5 IMF and Mexico: Appraisal -- 7 The Widening Gyre -- 7.1 East Asia -- 7.2 IMF and East Asia: Appraisal -- 8 Fiscal Follies -- 8.1 Russia -- 8.2 IMF and Russia: Appraisal -- 8.3 Brazil -- 8.4 Argentina -- 8.5 IMF and Argentina: Appraisal -- 9 Lessons Learned -- 9.1 Reforms -- 9.2 International Lender of Last Resort -- 9.3 FSF and Basel II -- 9.4 Reserves and Regional Arrangements -- 10 The Great Recession -- 10.1 Global Imbalances -- 10.2 Premonitions -- 10.3 Impasse -- 10.4 Implosion -- 10.5 IMF and the Great Recession: Appraisal -- 11 The World Turned Upside Down -- 11.1 Debt Again -- 11.2 Integration or Autonomy? -- 11.3 What Is to Be Done? -- Appendix: IMF Data -- References -- Index.