The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games : perfect, public, and private
by Masaki Aoyagi, V. Bhaskar, and Guillaume R. Fréchette
| Year of publication: |
February 2019
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|---|---|
| Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki ; Bhaskar, V. ; Fréchette, Guillaume R. |
| Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 11.2019, 1, p. 1-43
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| Subject: | Kooperation | Cooperation | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Kontrolle | Control | Experiment |
| Type of publication: | Article |
|---|---|
| Type of publication (narrower categories): | Aufsatz in Zeitschrift ; Article in journal |
| Language: | English |
| Other identifiers: | 10.1257/mic.20160304 [DOI] |
| Source: | ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW |
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011981544