The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games : perfect, public, and private
Year of publication: |
February 2019
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki ; Bhaskar, V. ; Fréchette, Guillaume R. |
Published in: |
American economic journal : a journal of the American Economic Association. - Nashville, Tenn. : AEA, ISSN 1945-7669, ZDB-ID 2442378-6. - Vol. 11.2019, 1, p. 1-43
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Subject: | Kooperation | Cooperation | Unvollkommene Information | Incomplete information | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Gefangenendilemma | Prisoner's dilemma | Wiederholte Spiele | Repeated games | Kontrolle | Control | Experiment |
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