The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games: Perfect, public, and private
Year of publication: |
2015
|
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Authors: | Aoyagi, Masaki ; Bhaskar, V. ; Frechette, Guillaume R. |
Publisher: |
Osaka : Osaka University, Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) |
Subject: | infinitely repeated games | monitoring | perfect | public | private | experiments |
Series: | ISER Discussion Paper ; 942 |
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Type of publication: | Book / Working Paper |
Type of publication (narrower categories): | Working Paper |
Language: | English |
Other identifiers: | 832543403 [GVK] hdl:10419/127071 [Handle] |
Classification: | C72 - Noncooperative Games ; C73 - Stochastic and Dynamic Games ; C92 - Laboratory; Group Behavior |
Source: |
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The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games : perfect, public, and private
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Dvorak, Fabian, (2018)
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Collusion in Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring
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The impact of monitoring in infinitely repeated games : perfect, public, and private
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The Impact of Monitoring in Infinitely Repeated Games : Perfect, Public, and Private
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