The importance of luck in executive promotion tournaments : theory and evidence
| Year of publication: |
2025
|
|---|---|
| Authors: | DeVaro, Jed ; Fung, Scott |
| Published in: |
Journal of business finance & accounting : JBFA. - Oxford : Wiley-Blackwell, ISSN 1468-5957, ZDB-ID 2020001-8. - Vol. 52.2025, 3, p. 1349-1373
|
| Subject: | classic and market-based tournaments | executive compensation | firm size | importance of luck | market structure | promotion tournaments | uncertainty in promotion contests | vertical pay disparity | Führungskräfte | Managers | Theorie | Theory | Betriebsgröße | Firm size | Wettbewerb | Competition | Managervergütung | Executive compensation | Leistungsentgelt | Performance pay | Marktstruktur | Market structure | Lohn | Wages | Prinzipal-Agent-Theorie | Agency theory | Extensives Spiel | Extensive form game |
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The importance of luck in executive promotion tournaments : theory and evidence
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