The influence of contract length on the performance of sequential conservation auctions
Year of publication: |
2022
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Authors: | Glebe, Thilo W. |
Published in: |
American journal of agricultural economics. - Hoboken, NJ : Wiley, ISSN 1467-8276, ZDB-ID 2026345-4. - Vol. 104.2022, 2, p. 739-764
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Subject: | agri-environmental policy | conservation auctions | conservation contracting | contract length | sequential auctions | Auktion | Auction | Vertrag | Contract | Auktionstheorie | Auction theory | Naturschutz | Nature conservation | Landwirtschaft | Agriculture | Umweltschutz | Environmental protection | Vertragstheorie | Contract theory | Umweltpolitik | Environmental policy | Agrarpolitik | Agricultural policy |
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