The Itch to Regulate : The Political Economy of U.S. Barber Licensure in the Progressive Era

Were public interest or public choice factors the primary reason for the adoption of state barber licensure in the United States during the Progressive Era? The primary public interest rationale for licensure was to protect the public from a communicable disease known as the “barber’s itch.” This paper uses historical newspapers to craft a novel dataset of the reported cases and outbreaks of barber’s itch, advertisements for barber’s itch cures, and advertisements for safety razors for eighteen states that adopted and maintained licensure from 1897 to 1920. While barber’s itch was a troublesome disease, we fail to find evidence that licensure was adopted in response to high caseloads. The data also show that licensure failed to reduce the incidence of barber’s itch. Using newspaper reporting, we also detail the investments that barbershops made to assure patrons of health and safety, further undermining the public interest rationale. Rather, we find that barber’s unions used barber’s itch to advance licensure to thwart competition from discount barbershops and to restrict the supply of barbers coming from barber colleges. There was an increased incidence of newspapers reporting on increased barber prices following licensure, with the reported price of haircuts and shaves increasing 44.4% and 54.9% on average. While licensure was ineffective at stopping barber’s itch, it was effective at restricting competition