The Kreps-Scheinkman game in mixed duopolies

In this paper we generalize the results of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) to mixed-duopolies. We show that quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes not only in the case of private firms but also when a public firm is involved.

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Year of publication:	2014-01-15
Authors:	Bakó, Barna ; Tasnádi, Attila
Institutions:	Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Subject:	Mixed duopoly \| Cournot \| Bertrand-Edgeworth

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Extent:	application/pdf
Series:	MPRA Paper.
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L13 - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011113442