The Limits of Meritocracy

We show that too much meritocracy, modeled as accuracy of performance ranking incontests, can be a bad thing: in contests with homogeneous agents, it reduces output and isPareto inefficient. In contests with sufficiently heterogeneous agents, discouragement andcomplacency effects further reduce the benefits of meritocracy. Perfect meritocracy maybe optimal only for intermediate levels of heterogeneity

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Year of publication:	2018
Authors:	Morgan, John
Other Persons:	Tumlinson, Justin (contributor) ; Várdy, Felix (contributor)
Publisher:	[2018]: [S.l.] : SSRN

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (88 p)
Series:	IMF Working Paper ; No. 18/231
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments November 2018 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.3297652 [DOI]
Classification:	d22 ; d47 ; D61 - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis ; D63 - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement ; L23 - Organization of Production
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906885