The minimum wage from a two-sided perspective

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms’ job offer and workers’ job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives.

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Brown, Alessio J.G. ; Merkl, Christian ; Snower, Dennis J.
Published in:	Economics Letters. - Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765. - Vol. 124.2014, 3, p. 389-391
Publisher:	Elsevier
Subject:	Minimum wage \| Labor market \| Employment \| Unemployment \| Job offer \| Job acceptance

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Type of publication:	Article
Classification:	J3 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs ; J6 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies ; J2 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

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