The Minimum Wage from a Two-Sided Perspective

This paper sheds new light on the effects of the minimum wage on employment from a two-sided theoretical perspective, in which firms' job offer and workers' job acceptance decisions are disentangled. Minimum wages reduce job offer incentives and increase job acceptance incentives. We show that sufficiently low minimum wages may do no harm to employment, since their job-offer disincentives are countervailed by their job-acceptance incentives

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Year of publication:	2014
Authors:	Brown, Alessio J. G.
Other Persons:	Merkl, Christian (contributor) ; Snower, Dennis J. (contributor)
Publisher:	[2014]: [S.l.] : SSRN
Subject:	Mindestlohn \| Minimum wage \| Theorie \| Theory

Extent:	1 Online-Ressource (10 p)
Series:	CESifo Working Paper Series ; No. 4868
Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Language:	English
Notes:	Nach Informationen von SSRN wurde die ursprüngliche Fassung des Dokuments June 25, 2014 erstellt
Other identifiers:	10.2139/ssrn.2463624 [DOI]
Classification:	J30 - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs. General ; J60 - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies. General ; J20 - Time Allocation; Work Behavior; Employment Determination and Creation. General
Source:	ECONIS - Online Catalogue of the ZBW

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10013051265