The Nonequivalence of Vertical Merger and Exclusive Dealing.

Using the simple model of Comanor and Frech (1985), I show that vertical mergers and exclusive dealing contracts are not behaviorally equivalent.

Year of publication:	1996
Authors:	Frech, H.E.
Subject:	CONTRACTS \| MERGERS \| OLIGOPOLIES

Type of publication:	Book / Working Paper
Notes:	42 pages
Classification:	D43 - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection ; L14 - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation; Networks ; L22 - Firm Organization and Market Structure: Markets vs. Hierarchies; Vertical Integration ; L42 - Vertical Restraints; Resale Price Maintenance; Quantity Discounts ; K21 - Antitrust Law
Source:	RePEc - Research Papers in Economics

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005245561