The optimal disclosure policy in contests with stochastic entry : a Bayesian persuasion perspective
Year of publication: |
October 2016
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Authors: | Feng, Xin ; Lu, Jingfeng |
Published in: |
Economics letters. - Amsterdam [u.a.] : Elsevier, ISSN 0165-1765, ZDB-ID 717210-2. - Vol. 147.2016, p. 103-107
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Subject: | Bayesian persuasion | Contests | Information disclosure | Stochastic entry | Spieltheorie | Game theory | Wettbewerb | Competition | Bayes-Statistik | Bayesian inference | Markteintritt | Market entry | Asymmetrische Information | Asymmetric information | Informationsökonomik | Economics of information |
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